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THE CHARACTER OF THE “NEW ECONOMIC POLICY” AND ITS DISTORTION  

Date:
Nov 17, 2026
Vladimir_Lenin_giving_a_speech

by Vasilis Opsimos[1]

 

For decades now, various forces have argued that the measures of what was termed the “New Economic Policy” (NEP), implemented by Soviet power in the 1920s, supposedly demonstrate the necessity of a transitional period —a transitional society that would pave the way for the transition to socialism—and that market mechanisms and commodity-money relations must constitute an irreplaceable, dominant, and long-term tool in socialist construction. Typical examples include the CPSU itself during the years of the so-called “perestroika,” as well as the CP China today. Even when no explicit reference is made to the NEP, however, attempts are made to justify the shift toward measures that strengthen capitalist relations of production as an expression of a flexible “revolutionary tactic,” similar to that of Lenin under the difficult circumstances of a turning point and pressure from the class enemy, when the future of the revolution was at stake.

As the KKE points out, “the approach that posits the existence of ‘transitional societies’ with distinct characteristics—both in relation to capitalism and to socialism—is mistaken. Based on this view, the development of capitalist relations in China and Vietnam is erroneously interpreted as a transitional ‘multi-sectoral society’.”[2] A correct understanding, therefore, of the nature of the NEP, as clearly defined by Lenin and the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, is an indispensable theoretical weapon for refuting similar views that attempt to theorize their deviation on issues of the political economy of socialism.

 

THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE NEP WAS IMPLEMENTED 

The adoption of the NEP by the 10th Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1921[3] marked a forced, temporary retreat from the policy of the workers’ state. It was implemented under conditions in which the protracted civil war and the imperialist intervention—which Soviet power had faced from the very first days of its establishment, combined with the disruption caused by the imperialist war, had reduced agricultural production to half of its pre-revolutionary level. A similar situation in socialist industry—which alone could serve as the driving force of socialist construction and also lead agricultural production onto the path of collective organization— revealed the temporary inability of workers’ power to secure the necessary volume of products for an immediate (communist) distribution in the village.

The measures requiring the compulsory delivery of agricultural surpluses that characterized the period of what was known as “war communism” (1918–1920)—a period dominated by “the immediate, urgent, and imperative task of warding off the danger of being instantly overwhelmed by the gigantic forces of international imperialism”[4], could not continue without jeopardizing the alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The vast masses of small and medium-sized peasantry, who had benefited from the land redistribution carried out by the Soviet power and had supported that power through the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army against attempts to restore the old regime, had begun to grow dissatisfied with the prevailing conditions in agricultural production. Lenin, noting “overwork and exhaustion among the masses,”[5] characterized the situation facing the Soviet state at the time as a “peasant (petty-bourgeois) counterrevolution (…) that already exists against us.”[6]  In other words, he clearly articulated the class stakes that necessitated the temporary shift in economic policy.

Under the NEP measures, what was designated as surplus appropriation (the compulsory delivery of agricultural surpluses to the state) was replaced by a smaller “tax in kind,” so that a larger portion of production remained at the farmer’s disposal and could be marketed by the farmer himself within local economic circulation. At the same time, in the sphere of industrial production, private capital was permitted to operate to a limited extent, either through the concession of enterprises and raw material deposits[7] to foreign capitalists, while maintaining their nationalization (in practice, these concessions were not widely implemented and played an insignificant role in the production of industrial goods[8]), or through the leasing of enterprises to local capitalists. A characteristic feature of the NEP era was also the emergence of a relatively large class of middlemen (who embodied the classic figure of the so-called “NEPman”), often directly involved with consumer cooperatives and a number of their officials in both urban and rural areas.

 

THE NATURE OF THE NEP AND THE GOALS OF THE BOLSHEVIKS 

Compared to the years of “war communism,” the NEP was characterized by the partial restoration and strengthening of commodity-money relations in both urban and rural areas, under the guiding control of the Soviet authority. It was grounded in the objective material interests and incentives of the small-scale commodity-producing peasant, within the framework of his social alliance with the working class—an alliance in which, as Lenin emphasized, “the interests of these two classes are different.”[9]

He advocated for a “respite like that of Brest, an economic respite (…) We cannot strengthen large-scale production, the factories, and the proletariat without revitalizing, to a certain extent, the petty bourgeoisie and its commercial activities”[10]. They viewed the NEP as a temporary, brief period of construction that provided valuable time to consolidate the alliance between the working class and the peasantry and to rebuild socialist industry through the accumulation of reserves from agricultural production.

A study of Lenin’s works clearly shows that the leader of the October Revolution did not view the NEP and the expansion of the market relations it temporarily introduced as an inevitable stage in the process of socialist construction, as some kind of intermediate socio-economic system that is supposedly necessary for the development of the productive forces in countries where the workers’ power inherits a less developed social character of production and numerous small-peasant strata from capitalism. For this reason, when referring to the significance of the NEP period “from an international perspective,” he focused on resolving the issue of the proletariat’s relations with the peasantry under workers’ power, rather than on any one specific policy measure. [11]

The restoration of industry would enable the workers’ power to provide agricultural production with the material and technical infrastructure (tractors, combine harvesters, fertilizers, etc.) that would create the technical foundation for the transition to large-scale, collective farming. At the same time, the respite provided by these years would make it possible to consolidate and expand Soviet institutions in the countryside, a necessary tool for raising the consciousness of the small and medium peasantry and waging the class struggle against the powerful remnants of small-scale private ownership and the influence of the kulaks. The declared and consistent goal of the Soviet leadership was to facilitate, in practice, the expansion of communist relations of production—a goal that naturally required the gradual elimination of commodity-money relations and the market.

By its very nature (the expansion of market mechanisms), the NEP contained contradictions and posed significant risks of a reversal of the revolution, including through the strengthening of social strata that would have a direct material interest in undermining and overthrowing workers’ power. The Bolsheviks, of course, were not unaware of the dangers of the NEP and systematically studied ways to counter them. As Lenin pointed out as early as the spring of 1921, a complete restoration of private property and commerce would mean “an inevitable slide back under the rule of the landlords and capitalists,” an inevitable division “between capitalists and wage laborers, that is, the re-establishment of capitalist wage slavery.”[12] Any agreement with the peasantry was viewed as permissible and correct from the standpoint of the working class only if it “supports the dictatorship of the working class and constitutes one of the measures aimed at the elimination of classes.”[13]

The dangers to workers’ power—which were highlighted from the outset in Bolshevik writings—could not be addressed spontaneously, through the operation of market laws, but required the class-based policy of the workers’ state to clearly define the limits of free trade and skillfully escalate the class struggle against the social strata that were objectively developing within the realm of commodity-money relations, and—through Central Planning, the gradual elimination of these relations and all remnants of the old socio-economic formation.

Addressing these risks required a systematic effort to revive, strengthen, and expand socialist industry and Central Planning—within the framework, naturally, of the objective constraints imposed by the NEP-mandated “expansion of the autonomy and initiative of each large enterprise in the management of financial resources and material supplies.”[14] The apparent strengthening of class-hostile elements forced Lenin, just one year after the implementation of the NEP, at the 11th Party Congress in 1922, to already speak of “halting the retreat,” and “preparing (economically) for the offensive against private capital.”[15]

Furthermore, at a time when socialist construction was proceeding exclusively within the framework of Soviet Russia and imperialist encirclement threatened workers’ power—even through the “peaceful” embrace of commercial exchanges— the state monopoly on foreign trade, which had already been established in April 1918, served as an important tool against the dangers of the NEP. For this reason, Lenin, despite the serious health problems he was already facing, waged a fierce battle in the second half of 1922 against those within the Party who proposed relaxing the state monopoly on foreign trade as a necessary component of the NEP’s logic. “In practice, Bukharin takes up the defense of the speculator, the petty bourgeoisie, and the peasant elite against the industrial proletariat, which is by no means in a position to rebuild its industry or turn Russia into an industrial nation, unless it safeguards it—not, of course, through customs policy, but exclusively and only through the state monopoly on foreign trade.” [16]

The Plenum of the CC of the RCP(b) on December 18, 1922, confirmed in a resolution “the necessity of maintaining and organizationally strengthening the state monopoly on foreign trade, prohibiting, under penalty of severe sanctions, any statements against the monopoly on foreign trade in negotiations with representatives of foreign capital in Russia and abroad.” In a corresponding resolution, the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) in April 1923 declared itself “categorically in favor of the inviolability of the state monopoly on foreign trade, considers any violation or wavering in its implementation to be unacceptable, and instructs the new CC to take systematic measures to strengthen and develop the monopoly on foreign trade [17]

In the class-contradictory conditions created by the implementation of NEP policies, the institutions of Soviet power had to adapt in order to defend the interests of the working class and its allies. A prime example is the great emphasis Lenin placed on reorganizing the People’s Commissariat of Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (WPI) as a mechanism for controlling private business activity. From early 1922 and onward, he had pointed out to the People’s Commissariat of Justice the need to draft “a clear and precise law extending the WPI’s right to inspect and receive information concerning all and every kind of institution and enterprise (including private, cooperative, and concessionary, etc.).”[18] Despite the subsequent relevant decisions by Soviet bodies, such as the Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on March 16, 1922, which entrusted the WPI with “effective control over all financial and material resources granted and loaned to all—without exception—state, social, private, and mixed-type organizations, institutions, and enterprises,”[19] weaknesses in the WPI’s operations under the NEP conditions appear to have persisted.

Thus, on November 2, 1922, Lenin discussed the problems of reorganizing the WPI with Stalin and Kamenev and, based on the results of that discussion, set forth his proposals in a directive to Tsiurupa, deputy chairman of the Council of Labor and Defense, with the general directive that the People’s Commissariat of the WPI should become “strong and independent while retaining its previous functions.”[20] Based on Lenin’s proposals, in two of his final writings,[21] the 12th Congress of the RCP(b) in April 1923 adopted a special resolution “On the Tasks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection.”

The need to defend workers’ power against the growing strength of capitalist elements under the conditions of the NEP was also reflected in the Soviet Constitution. Thus, the 1924 Constitution, following similar provisions of the 1918 Constitution, excluded a number of categories of the population from the right to vote: those who hired labor, those who lived off unearned income, private merchants, the clergy, and employees of the tsarist repressive apparatus. In the 1927 elections, the percentage of those deprived of the right to vote was 3.5% in rural areas and 7.7% in cities. In the 1929 elections, the percentage of those excluded was 4.9% (8.5% in cities and 4.1% in rural areas), and in the 1931 elections, it was 3.9% (4.9% in cities and 3.7% in rural areas).[22] These rates declined after 1931, so that by 1934 the rate for the country as a whole was 2.5%.[23]

From the mid-1920s onward, amid the contradictions generated by the NEP, the Soviet leadership was concerned about the trend toward a decrease in the percentage of those excluded from the right to vote. In his report on the results of the re-election to the Soviets to the Plenum of the CC of the AUCP(b) in July 1926, V. M. Molotov pointed out that: “Under the present conditions, when the kulaks are growing in number, when there is a rise in NEPmen and, in general, bourgeois elements in the city, we must follow a line that does not allow for a reduction in the number of those deprived of the right to participate in elections to the Soviets in accordance with the Soviet Constitution, but rather, in light of the growth of exploitative elements in the country, this segment should be expanded somewhat.”[24]  Defending the proletarian character of power required the explicit exclusion from participation in Soviet bodies—and, of course, from the ranks of the Communist Party—of those elements that were acquiring wealth on the basis of the partial development of capitalist relations.

 

THE CONFLICT OVER THE NEP

The brief period of full implementation of the NEP (1921–1928) was marked by a fierce and multifaceted struggle within the Party between the revolutionary wing and various opportunist tendencies, which, under one guise or another, reflected petty-bourgeois pressure within the Party. On the one hand, there were Trotsky’s views, which, by underestimating the need for- and the possibilities of- a revolutionary alliance between the working class and the working strata of the peasantry, and by overestimating the backwardness of the productive forces in the Soviet Union, denied the possibility of building socialism in the country. On the other hand, with the views of the right-wing deviation (Bukharin, Rykov, etc.)—which posited commodity-money relations and individual ownership of the means of production as fundamental elements of agricultural development and proposed the coexistence of the market and socialized production for a very long period. Over time, these various currents found expression, more or less clearly, through a “mishmash” of opposition tendencies and an opportunistic coalition. [25]

It is not the aim of this article to trace in detail the evolution of the various opposition views on the NEP within the Bolshevik Party, nor the formations and realignments of alliances among the various party leaders who expressed them. It is important, however, to highlight their methodological basis, as reflected first and foremost in Trotsky’s positions, since the logic of his view—that revolutionary developments in the most developed capitalist countries had to materialize before proceeding with socialist construction— the necessity of more or less stable concessions to the remnants of the old relations of production, and the resulting attenuation of the class struggle—all of which seem to have served as the binding force of the opposition coalition, while they continue to appear today in various circles as a so-called “left-wing” critique  of “Stalinism”.

In 1922, at a time when he still held significant leadership responsibilities within the Soviet government, Trotsky revived the essentially Menshevik notion that “isolated socialist construction within the framework of the nation-state” was supposedly unfeasible…. “The real rise of the socialist economy in Russia will be possible only after the victory of the proletariat in the major countries of Europe”[26] At the same time, again in 1922, when the cementing of the alliance with the peasantry had been established as the central issue of the NEP, Trotsky reiterated his pre-revolutionary positions—for which he had clashed bitterly with Lenin and the Bolshevik Party—according to which the proletariat, from the very outset of its rule, “will come into hostile conflict not only with all sections of the bourgeoisie… but also with the broad masses of the peasantry… the contradictions between a workers’ government and the overwhelming majority of the peasantry in a backward country… can be resolved only on an international scale.” [27]

These theoretical views of Trotsky, with their clear lack of faith in the working class’s ability to form an alliance with the broad masses of the peasantry, explain his rejection of the AUCP(b) position regarding the possibility of building socialism in a single country, the Soviet Union. However, they also predetermine the way in which he perceives the character and tasks of the NEP, in contrast to Lenin and the majority of the Party. In his speech at the 4th Congress of the Communist International in November 1922, Trotsky characterized the NEP as “a necessary stage in the development of state-owned industry. “Between capitalism, where the means of production are privately owned and all economic relations are regulated by the market, and full-fledged socialism, with its socially planned economy, there are a series of transitional stages—and the NEP is essentially one of those stages.” [28]

Indicative of Trotsky’s fundamentally different approach to NEP issues is his understanding of the role of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, to which, as we mentioned earlier, Lenin paid particular attention during 1922. Although Trotsky himself later attempted to portray himself as Lenin’s right-hand man at that particular time, [29] his position on the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate is revealing: “Under market economy conditions, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection is utter and complete nonsense, whereas accounting is everything. Today, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection is the market itself of workers and peasants. It is, in essence, a substantive audit that does not deceive. All one needs to do is be able to record the findings of this market audit—that is, calculate expenditures and revenues and determine whether there are losses or profits.” [30]

Trotsky’s concession to the supposedly necessary role of the market in regulating economic relations and in the sphere of socialist industry explains why, 10 years later—at a time when, through the first Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) had rapidly advanced industrialization and collectivization[31] in the Soviet Union, Trotsky—rejecting the laying of the foundations of socialism—continued to argue that "the innumerable living participants in the economy, state and private, collective and individual, must serve notice of their needs and of their relative strength not only through the statistical determinations of plan commissions but also through the direct pressure of supply and demand. The plan is checked and, to a considerable degree, realized through the market... Economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations."[32]  At the same time, the so-called “right-wing opposition” (Bukharin, Rykov, etc.) attributed the grain crisis to secondary causes. It fostered the illusion that “the kulak cooperative centers would be integrated into the same system [note: of the all-state organs] through the banks.” That acts of sabotage by the kulaks “would become increasingly rare and eventually disappear without a trace…. to the extent that this mechanism improves, to the extent that all the lower-level cells of Soviet power are strengthened….” In other words, a gradual eradication of the class struggle through the integration of the kulaks into the “unified chain of the socialist economy”[33] 

These views of the “right-wing opposition” regarding the issues of class struggle coincide entirely with what Trotsky proposed during the same period (1930): “Let us put an end to the policy of administratively abolishing the kulak. Restraining the kulaks’ exploitative tendencies will remain a necessary policy for many years… Let us put an end to the breakneck pace of industrialization…. Let us abandon the ‘utopian’ goal of a closed economy. Let us develop a new version of our plans based on the greatest possible interaction with the global market.” [34]

 

THE RESULTS OF THE NEP AND THE REVOLUTIONARY WAY FORWARD

The NEP, in accordance with the Bolsheviks’ plans, provided a crucial window of opportunity for the recovery and reorganization of socialist industry. It allowed the alliance between the working class and the small and medium-sized peasantry to take root, under the leadership of the former. At the same time, however, a new bourgeoisie emerged, consisting of merchants, tenant farmers, speculators, entrepreneurs, brokers, etc. By 1926, together with their families, they numbered 2.3 million (1.6% of the population). This marked an intensification of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements of the economy. The 15th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in December 1927 assessed that “the process of development of capitalist elements in the countryside has noticeably intensified in recent years…. the fundamental issue of the village’s economic development lies in the fact that the benefits of large-scale farming are currently reaped by the wealthy kulak elements… “This is the fundamental economic contradiction in the village, from which we must find a way out for the poor and middle-income farmers.”[35]

By 1926, agricultural production had reached or even exceeded pre-war levels. The situation of small- and medium-scale farmers had improved to some extent. At the same time, however, there were approximately 8 million farmers who owned neither a horse nor a plow, while at the same time, 8.4% of farms (owned by wealthy villagers—kulaks—as well as by middle-class farmers) hired labor on an occasional basis. In 1924–1925, the village bourgeoisie constituted 3.3% of the rural population, and over 2 million agricultural workers labored on their farms.

Even revisionist Soviet historians, who in the 1960s strongly criticized the policy of collectivization, acknowledged that during this period at least half of all rural households were subject to exploitative relationships, the core of which was the leasing of means of production (animals, tools, land) by the kulaks to poor and middle-class farmers and the provision of wage labor by the latter to the former.

In large-scale industry, private capital accounted for only 4% of industrial production in 1925–1926 and employed only 2.6% of the workforce across the entire industrial sector. However, if one takes into account small-scale and home-based crafts—the majority of which consisted of home-based artisans and professionals who did not employ wage labor— private industry accounted for 24.2% of industrial production in 1924–1925.

From the mid-1920s onward, there was a trend toward the expansion of the socialist sector in various branches of industry: from 73.3% of total industrial production in 1925, socialist industry came to account for 86% by 1927. At the same time, there was a corresponding trend toward a reduction in private capital’s (NEPmen) control over retail trade. Thus, by the end of 1925, the state’s share of retail trade was nearly 23% (16% in 1923–24), that of consumer cooperatives was 32.9% (25.9%), and that of private merchants was 44.3% (57%).

It should be noted, of course, that consumer cooperatives—which under Soviet rule played a primary role in fulfilling state plans to exchange industrial output for farmers’ surpluses and in driving private capital out of commodity circulation, thus protecting socialist industry from the speculative maneuvers of private merchants—were not free from the inherent contradictions of the NEP, both because of the commodity-money nature of their transactions and because of the dealings of a portion of their managerial staff with private merchants." It is telling that in a letter to Molotov in September 1926, Stalin emphasized the need to take specific measures to expose and prosecute the NEPmen “who are hanging around in the supply and cooperative organizations” and violate the directives of the Soviet authorities, “undermining the entire economic and Soviet apparatus.” [36]

Overall, the years 1927–1928 marked a turning point in the course of socialist construction, as the Soviet Union transitioned from the period of recovery to the period of industrial reorganization, while the class struggle also intensified. Amid the re-division of markets and spheres of influence and preparations for a new imperialist war, the issue of more intensive industrial development—including for the USSR’s defense needs—became even more urgent.

In the last quarter of 1927, a significant shortfall began to be observed in the state grain procurement (it fell to 52% of the corresponding quarter of the previous year). The problem became clearer in January 1928: despite a good harvest, state grain procurement up to that point stood at 300 million pood, compared to 428 million pood during the corresponding period the previous year. Given the contradictions of the NEP, the widespread dominance of commodity-money relations in agricultural production, and the growing influence of the kulaks, the crisis that arose in grain procurement did not come as a bolt from the blue.

At the 15th Congress of the AUCP(b) in December 1927, the CC’s Political Report highlighted the intensifying difficulties on the agricultural production front. The relatively slow pace of growth in the agricultural economy compared to the growth rates of socialist industry was attributed to the extreme backwardness of agricultural technology, the low level of cultural development in the villages, and, above all, to the fact that “our fragmented agricultural production lacks the advantages enjoyed by large, unified, nationalized industry.”

Although the USSR had reached its prewar level of grain production, marketable grain was half as much and grain exports were one-twentieth of their pre-war levels. It was observed that, despite the growing role in the previous years of consumer cooperatives and the state in commercial transactions between industry and agricultural production, the productive role of state-owned (sovkhoz) and cooperative (kolkhoz) farms remained negligible: they accounted for only 1.7% of total grain production and 6% of their marketable output.[37]

The 15th Congress, in deciding to draw up the USSR’s first Five-Year Plan, the central element of which was a very significant increase in the rates of industrial growth (first and foremost in Subdivision I[38]), also adopted a special Resolution on work in the rural areas.[39] The Resolution established as the Party’s primary task in rural areas the consolidation and transformation of small individual farms into large collectives (kolkhozes). It emphasized the need to support and strengthen various forms of cooperative farming by poor peasants, as well as the important role of state farms (sovkhozes) as “a model demonstrating the superiority of large-scale socialized production over small-scale agricultural production.” The great importance of introducing modern technology into agricultural production was also noted.

At the same time, specific measures were adopted to ensure that the kulaks were taxed effectively based on their actual incomes, to restrict land leasing—a practice that impoverished the peasantry and strengthened kulak elements— to require the kulaks to deliver all surplus grain they had withheld, and to purge state procurement agencies and consumer cooperatives of private business elements and the wealthier members of the village.

The problems caused for agricultural production in the Soviet Union by the small scale—until then—of the vast majority of farm households, compared to the potential offered by large-scale farming to increase labor productivity through the use of machinery, science, fertilizers, etc., were exploited by the village’s capitalist elements to undermine Soviet economic policy. There were reports from the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs that in many areas, the local, community-based administration (where the kulaks wielded strong influence) had supplanted the Soviet administration, and that the kulaks were beginning to coalesce into a distinct class stratum and force, with their own interests and agendas. That is why Stalin characterized the grain collection crisis of 1927–1928 as “the first, under the conditions of the NEP, serious offensive by the capitalist elements in the countryside against Soviet power.” [40]

Building on the tremendous results achieved by the first two Five-Year Plans in the development of industrial production in the USSR, collective farming through the kolkhozes and socialized ownership of the basic means of production in rural areas (land, large-scale machinery owned by the state and managed by the Tractor Stations), collectivization was a significant step forward in rural areas. It resolved fundamental issues regarding the supply of goods to the working class in the cities during that period, serving as a factor in consolidating workers’ power. By boosting productivity in rural areas, it freed up labor that swelled the ranks of the working class and drove industrialization forward. With the elimination of the kulaks as a class, the plans of the class-hostile elements for a gradual drift of Soviet power toward the restoration of capitalism were thwarted.

 

SOCIALISM OR A “TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY” TOWARD CAPITALISM? 

The ultimate goals of the communists have been clearly defined by the founders of the Marxist-Leninist worldview: the elimination of class divisions and the formation of a classless society; the elimination of commodity-money relations; the elimination of the contradictions arising from the division of labor (between mental and manual labor, between city and countryside); and the withering away of the state.[41] "The transition to this classless, communist society is a relatively long-term process that begins with the working class seizing political power."

The new society, emerging from the very heart of capitalist society, bears within it the strong marks of the old at every level. The fundamental difference between the socialist revolution and all previous revolutionary upheavals is that the new communist relations of production cannot take shape within the framework of capitalism, but must be consciously “built” through the policy of workers’ power, and developed after the working class seizes power. The same applies to all social relations in general (ideology, law, culture—in short, the entire structure of the new society).

The first, immature phase of the communist socio-economic formation does not constitute an autonomous socio-economic formation, but a transitional period toward developed communism, during which it must at every moment abolish and eliminate the remnants of capitalist society. Under socialism, for example, class exploitation and the commodification of labor power are abolished, but not every form of social inequality and stratification is eliminated. Capitalist property is abolished relatively quickly, but forms of collective ownership that do not constitute social ownership (e.g., agricultural production cooperatives) may persist for a time. The contradictions between collective and social ownership, and between managerial and executive labor, remain. Social classes and the contradictions between them continue to exist; therefore, the class struggle of the working class continues, albeit in different forms and through different means.

During the socialist phase:

►Social ownership must be gradually extended to encompass all of society’s means of production.

►All of society’s labor and resources must be increasingly allocated through Central Planning based on social needs.

►Commodity-money relations—that is, the production of goods as commodities and the circulation of money—must be gradually and systematically eliminated by society.

►Consumer goods should gradually cease to be distributed in monetary form, and society should become increasingly capable of distributing the total social product not “on the basis of the labor” contributed by each member, but “on the basis of the needs” of each individual.

►The institutions and organs of workers’ power—the dictatorship of the proletariat—must consolidate and strengthen the leading role of the working class in society, develop the active participation of the masses in the management of social affairs, and shape the new human being who will prioritize the general social interest over individual or group interests.

This is the direction in which socialist construction must move, without wavering, but also without underestimating the fact that it is a process of struggle between the shoots of the new and the remnants of the old. In the course of socialist construction, by its very nature, two tendencies coexist and clash. If the trend toward strengthening social ownership and central planning plays a leading role, then socialist construction advances toward a classless society. If the opposite tendency—that of weakening them—prevails, socialist construction is undermined and may lead to historically outdated forms and the triumph of counterrevolution.

Here, the role of the subjective factor—the leading organs of the Communist Party and the state—is crucial. They must possess the necessary level of theoretical maturity and political preparedness, so that they can identify the contradictions that inevitably exist in socialism and consciously utilize the laws of the socialist economy in order to resolve them for the benefit of building communism.

To deepen the relations of production, adapting them and bringing them into line with the forces of production, so that they “constitute the main driving force behind the further development of the forces of production” and do not “become a hindrance to them.”[42] To keep the working class firmly at the helm, to understand the necessity of maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the entire phase of immature communism. The triumph of the counterrevolution in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries proved that “the scientific and class-based nature of the Communist Party’s policy is a decisive prerequisite for socialist construction. To the extent that these elements are lost, opportunism gains ground, which, if left unchecked, develops into a counterrevolutionary force.” [43]

The notions claiming that socialism can be built through the widespread use of commodity-money relations, market mechanisms, and the extensive activity of private capital, through the economic autonomy of enterprises and horizontal economic relations among them, and through the abolition of the monopoly on foreign trade, run counter to the views of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and to the very laws governing socialist construction. Regardless of the subjective intentions of those who promote and implement them in real life, they throw the doors wide open to the growth and expansion of the bourgeois strata and, ultimately, to the triumph of counterrevolution.

They also flagrantly disregard the very historical experience of the development and ultimate prevalence of the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, with the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 serving as a defining moment of opportunistic shift. The fact that “the ever-increasing involvement of market elements in the direct social production of socialism was weakening it. It led to a decline in the momentum of socialist development. Short-term individual and group interests were reinforced (with an increase in the differentiation of labor income among workers within each enterprise, between workers and management, and among different enterprises) at the expense of general social interests. Over time, the social conditions were created for the counter-revolution to take root and ultimately prevail, with perestroika serving as its vehicle”[44]

 

 

 

[1]    Vasilis Opsimos is a member of the Ideological Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE).

[2]    “Assessments and Conclusions from Socialist Construction in the 20th Century, with a Focus on the USSR. The KKE’s View of Socialism,” Resolution of the 18th Congress of the KKE.

[3]    “V. I. Lenin, “Summing-up Speech and Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, pp. 57–84.

[4]    V.I. Lenin, “Political Report on the Activities of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) at the 11th Congress,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, p. 73.

[5]    V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, p. 68.

[6]    V. I. Lenin, “Draft Resolution on Replacing the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System with a Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, p. 371.

[7]    For more details on concessions, see: V. I. Lenin, “Report and Closing Speech on Concessions,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, pp. 165–182

[8]     In 1925, there were 92 concessions to foreign capital, of which 43 were in the industrial sector, employing 54,000 workers.

[9]    V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, p. 58.

[10]    V. I. Lenin, “Draft Resolution on Replacing the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System with a Tax in Kind,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, pp. 372–373.

[11]   V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Tactics of the RCP” at the Third Congress of the Communist International, Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, pp. 372–373.

[12]   V. I. Lenin, “Report on the Substitution of a Tax in Kind for the Surplus-Grain Appropriation System,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, p. 59, 61.

[13]         V. I. Lenin, "Report on the Tax in Kind" at the Tenth All-Russia Conference of the RCP(b) Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, pp. 372–373

[14]      V. I. Lenin, “Draft Resolution on the Issues of the New Economic Policy,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 43, p. 334.

[15]   V. I. Lenin, “Political Report on the Activities of the Central Committee of the RCP(b),” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, pp. 86, 412–413.

[16]   V. I. Lenin, “On the Monopoly of Foreign Trade,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, p. 336.

[17]   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, p. 588.

[18]    V. I. Lenin, “Letter to D. I. Kursky and Assignment to N. P. Gorbunov,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 54, p. 166.

[19]   V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 54, p. 620.

[20]   РГАСПИ, Ф. 5 Оп. 1, Д.2662, Л.100-104, όπως παρατίθεται από τον Сахаров, В. А. “Политическое завещание Ленина. Реальность истории и мифы политики” / В. А. Сахаров; под редакцией В. И. Тропин. — Москва : Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2003. Валентин Сахаров - Политическое завещание Ленина: реальность истории и мифы политики. читать книгу онлайн бесплатно

[21]   V. I. Lenin, “How We Should Reorganize the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection” and “Better Fewer but Better,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, pp. 383–406.  

[22]   «Выборы в советы и состав органов власти в СССР в 1931 г.»/ Центр. избир. комис. Президиума ЦИК СССР. - [М.]: Власть Советов, 1931, σελ. 35-37.

[23]   See Molotov's report to the 7th Congress of Soviets on the amendments to the Constitution of the USSR,

http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/126133#mode/inspect/page/13/zoom/4.

[24]    V. M. Molotov, “The Results of the Re-election to the Soviets Объединенный пленум ЦК и ЦКК ВКП(б). 14-23 июля 1926 г. Документы и материалы / сост., предисл. И.И. Кудрявцева. - М.: *Научно-политическая книга, 2023, σελ. 250.

[25]   The secret report of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the subsequent “rehabilitation decrees” denied the existence of a unified coalition of opposition forces in the 1930s. However, the well-known Trotskyist historian Pierre Broue, who had the opportunity to study the Trotsky archive housed at Harvard University Library, wrote in 1980 (“Trotsky et le bloc des oppositions de 1932,” *Cahiers Leon Trotsky* 5, Jan.–Mar. 1980, p. 5): “While conducting archival research at the Harvard University Library regarding the publication of the volumes of [Trotsky’s] *Collected Works* from 1936 and 1937, researchers and assistants from the Leon Trotsky Institute made an important discovery: the existence in the Soviet Union in 1932 of an opposition bloc against Stalin.”

[26]   L. Trotsky, afterword (1922) to the new edition of the pamphlet *Program of Peace: The Socialist United States of Europe*, Leon Trotsky: *The Program of Peace* (1915/1917)

[27]   L. Trotsky, preface to the first edition of the book *1905*, Vintage Books, New York, 1972, pp. vi–vii.

[28]   L. Trotsky, «Report on the New Soviet Economic Policy and the perspectives of world revolution», The First Five Years of the Communist International, Volume 2, New Park Publications, London, 1953, σελ. 233.

[29]   Trotsky attempted to conceal his deep disagreements with Lenin by emphasizing their tactical agreement “in defense of my [Lenin’s] views on the foreign trade monopoly” (V. I. Lenin, “Letter to I. V. Stalin Regarding the Members of the CC of the RCP, Collected Works, ed. Synchroni Epochi, vol. 45, p. 338). Neither the minutes of the CC Plenum on December 18, 1922, nor Trotsky’s own later writings record any active involvement on his part in the discussion of the issue at the Plenum or in the drafting of the relevant Resolution.

[30]   РГАСПИ, Ф. 5 Оп. 1, Д.1406, Л.14, όπως παρατίθεται από τον Сахаров, В. А. “Политическое завещание Ленина. Реальность истории и мифы политики” / В. А. Сахаров ; под редакцией В. И. Тропин. — Москва : Московский государственный университет имени М.В. Ломоносова, 2003. Валентин Сахаров - Политическое завещание Ленина: реальность истории и мифы политики. читать книгу онлайн бесплатно 

[31]   For a detailed discussion of the nature and role of collectivization in the USSR, see: V. Opsimos, “Collectivization in the USSR: Social Alliance and Class Struggle in Socialist Construction,” KOMEP, Issue 5/2017.

[32]      L. Trotsky, The Soviet economy in danger», Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1933, Leon Trotsky: The Soviet Economy in Danger (October 1932)

[33]   N. Bukharin, “The Road to Socialism,” as cited in: I. V. Stalin, “The Right-Wing Deviation in the CPSU(b),” Collected Works, vol. 12, pp. 43–44, 35.

[34]   L. Trotsky, Leon Trotsky, “Open Letter to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (The State of the Party and the Tasks of the Left Opposition),” Bulletin of the Opposition, No. 10, April 1930.

[35]   V. M. Molotov, Speech at the 15th Congress, XV съезд Всесоюзной Коммунистической партии (б). Декабрь 1928 года. Стенографический отчёт.— М.-Л.: Госиздат, 1928,. σελ. 1052,1056, 1067.

[36]   Сталин И.В., Cочинения. – Т. 17. – Тверь: Научно-издательская компания “Северная корона”, 2004. σελ. 248-251.

[37]   Marketable production: the portion of agricultural output that, through various channels, supplied non-agricultural areas (for consumption and production needs) and foreign trade. As socialist industry developed and the working class grew, this portion of production needed to increase steadily.

[38]   In Marxist Political Economy, Subsection I encompasses all branches of industrial production that produce means of production.

[39]   XV съезд Всесоюзной Коммунистической партии (б). Декабрь 1928 года. Стенографический отчёт.— М.-Л.: Госиздат, 1928, σελ. 1304-1317

[40]    . J. V. Stalin, “On the Work of the Joint Plenary Session of the Central Committee and the Central Executive Committee in April,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 11, p. 62.

[41]   V. I. Lenin, “The Great Initiative,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 39, p. 15. See also: Resolution of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), “Assessments and Conclusions from Socialist Construction in the 20th Century, with a Focus on the USSR: The KKE’s Conception of Socialism,” and the KKE Program.

[42]   J. V. Stalin, “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,” Collected Works, published by Synchroni Epochi, vol. 16, p. 362.

[43]   Resolution of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE): “Assessments and Conclusions from Socialist Construction in the 20th Century, with a Focus on the USSR. The KKE’s View of Socialism.”

[44]   Resolution of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE): “Assessments and Conclusions from Socialist Construction in the 20th Century, with a Focus on the USSR. The KKE’s View of Socialism.”